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Overview
Local governments around the world have
become key public sector actors during the
past two decades, and decentralization
now ranks among the most common and
consequential global reforms (See First
GOLD Report on Decentralization and Local
Democracy). This trend could ultimately be
as influential as other major institutional
transformations of the past century, such
as decolonization in Africa and Asia or the
transition
from
planned
to
market
economies in the former Soviet Union,
China, and elsewhere. Indeed, local
governments have in many respects truly
come of age. Their role is reinforced in
global policy circles, including through
major multilateral proclamations, such
as the European Charter of Local
Self-Government (1985) and the UN
Habitat Guidelines on Decentralization and
Reinforcement of Local Governments (2007).
In many regions of the world decentraliza
tion has enhanced the functions and auto
nomy of local entities. Local governments
play increasingly more critical roles in deli
vering basic infrastructure services, such
as roads, transportation and water, and so
cial services, such as education and health.
These developments have contributed in
minor and major ways to the progressive
deepening of local democracy, the allevia
tion of internal regional tensions in conflict
prone areas, the promotion of broader and
deeper citizen participation in public
affairs, and the overall strengthening and
efficiency of the public sector.
Decentralization has also generated a dramatic
upsurge in expectations. Citizens look more to
local governments for those public services that
improve daily living conditions. Central
governments depend on local governments to
support priority development and poverty
reduction goals. Private firms increasingly rely

on local governments to deliver infrastructure
and other services that support production and
stimulate job creation.
One of the most critical factors underlying
the ability of local governments to meet
the growing expectations placed on them is
the quality of the architecture and
operation of the intergovernmental fiscal
system. This Second GOLD Report focuses
on local government finance worldwide.
Local government finance is important not
only because the role and impact of local
governments have dramatically increased,
but also because this progress has recently
been confronted by daunting challenges.
The global economic and financial crisis that
emerged in 2008 —the most significant crisis
since the Great Depression— has imposed
major
financial
constraints
on
local
governments in many countries. Equally
important, central authorities in some
countries have responded to the crisis by
taking recentralization measures to deal with
their own fiscal problems and increasing
control over local governments. It is too early
to say whether these actions represent a
durable change in the decentralization trend,
but they clearly pose immediate challenges to
the viability and effectiveness of local
governments. Resource constraints during a
period of greater responsibility and need pose
obvious threats, but so does the damaging
curtailment of local government autonomy,
which is a necessary condition for the full rea
lization of the promise of decentralization.
Beyond the impact of the global financial crisis,
local governments are confronted with other
significant structural challenges. As substantial
urbanization continues unabated in some parts
of the world, public service demands are
growing faster than many local governments
can keep up with. New needs are also arising as
a result of an emerging understanding of the
onerous implications of global environmental
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challenges, as well as from major demographic
changes, such as the increasing number of the
elderly in some countries and the explosion of
youth as a share of the population in others.
These challenges, however, also present
opportunities to strengthen and boldly reinvent
the role of local governments. They are often in
a unique position of strength to deal with
pressing local problems, the solutions to which
have important national consequences.
The preceding regional chapters document
strengths and weaknesses of local government
fiscal frameworks in different parts of the world
and examine the capacity of local governments
mobilize
resources
and
manage
to
expenditures. The chapters also assess
intergovernmental relations and developments
in governance, such as broader and deeper
citizen participation in local planning and bud
geting.
This chapter
summarizes
key
challenges and issues discussed in the
preceding regional chapters, and points to
possible broad-based policy solutions that
could both alleviate problems and weaknesses
experienced to date and help to improve overall
local government performance.
The next section outlines basic contextual
factors that affect fiscal decentralization
worldwide. This is followed by a summary of
recent influential trends, experiences, and
policy issues. Building on the review of fiscal
decentralization parameters outlined in the
introduction and discussed in the regional
chapters, common and noteworthy local
government finance issues and challenges are
considered. Finally, the chapter closes with
recommendations and concluding thoughts on
the way forward in local finance reform and the
next steps for UCLG.
The Context of Reform: Diversity,
Politics and Change
The potential for local governments to serve as
full partners in managing public functions and

to contribute to local governance and improved
service delivery remains a promising, but only
partially fulfilled process in many countries. To
some extent this should be expected, as
decentralization
occurs
under
different
circumstances, is subject to powerful political
forces, and requires some minimum capacity to
be effective. Even in the most conducive
environments, decentralization is a highly
dynamic process that demands ongoing
adaptation to evolving economic, social and
political conditions.
Understanding Diversity

As highlighted in the introductory chapter,
countries have been subject to different
historical influences, so they are building
from diverse institutional and governance
traditions. This includes their experiences
with and inclinations towards decentra
lization, as well as their ability to absorb
decentralization reforms. The role of local
governments in public finance varies
considerably across regions (Figure 10.1 &
Table 10.1), and there are also large
differences within regions. An important
implication of these various differences is
that desired local finance reforms vary
considerably across regions and countries.
Clearly, the reforms needed to strengthen
local finances differ between countries that
have a long tradition with decentralization
and those with a shorter history of relevant
experience.
Local government finance is prospering in
much of Europe, North America, and parts of
East Asia and the Pacific (Korea, Japan,
Australia, New Zealand). It remains at an
early stage in some regions, such as the
Middle East & Western Asia, where most local
governments are deconcentrated units of the
central government with limited autonomy.
South Asia has a recent tradition of
democracy, but local governments face
controls by higher level governments. In Latin
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The Comparative Fiscal Role of Local Government: Expenditure and Revenue as a Percentage
of General Government Expenditure and Revenue
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The Comoarative Role of Local Government

Africa

Local expenditures aspercentage
of totalrevenues

Local expenditure aspercentage
oAotal expenditures

3.2

7.9

(3.6)

(6.8)

Asia
South Asia
East Asia
South-East Asia
Eurasia

1.5

16.0

(0.9)

(0.9)

20.0

40.0

(0.3)

(0.3)

5.3

15.5

(0.8)

(0.6)

N.A.

26.5
(15.1)

Europe (2008)
Latin America
Middle East 8t Western Asia

13.0

23.9

(07)

(0.5)

4.0

11.1

(4.5)

(73)

N.A.

4.6
(17)

North America

12.8

26.8

(0.6)
Notes: Coefficient of variation in parentheses. The means include: Africa: Benin, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Morocco,
Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. South Asia: Bangladesh, India, Pakistan; East Asia: China,
Japan, Korea; South -East Asia: Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand. Eurasia: Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine.
Europe: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Rep., Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Rep., Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Iceland, Norway,
Switzerland; Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru. Middle East and
Western Asia: Bahrain, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Palestine, Yemen. North America: Canada, U.S.A.
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America and Eurasia, local finances are
generally improving, but still face challenges
associated with past centralized traditions.
China and most of Southeast Asia have made
progress,
but
intergovernmental
fiscal
relations are unevenly developed and still
experience significant challenges. African
local
governments
are
rarely
well
empowered, but there are hopeful advances,
especially in some Anglophone countries,
such as South Africa or Tanzania.
One of the critical inferences emerging
from the diversity of local government
systems is that there is a need for diverse
approaches to deal with fiscal challenges,
even those that are relatively common.
There is no magic formula to ensure that
local government systems will function
effectively. The road to success requires
consistent and appropriately sequenced
application of basic local public finance
principles outlined in the introductory
chapter. These are relatively few, and they
leave adequate flexibility for each country
to structure its intergovernmental finance
system to fit its history and national goals.
Respondingto Political Reality

Decentralization is an intensely political process
since it involves the central government
assigning powers and granting autonomy to
local governments. While political forces can
often open the door to decentralization, as
discussed throughout this report, they can also
pose challenges. These include reluctance of
central politicians to devolve powers to local
governments for fear of losing control, the
opposition of central bureaucrats whose
institutional and personal goals conflict with
decentralization, or resistance to legally
mandated decentralization reforms during
implementation from elites and pre-existing
deconcentrated agencies. At the local level, local
politicians can undermine decentralization if
they are not sufficiently accountable to their

constituents. These political realities must be
understood and responded to if decentralization
is to be effective and prosper.
Developing Capacity

Effective local governments require admin
istrative capacity. Local government capacity
can be an important constraint, particularly in
developing countries. At times, perhaps
somewhat paradoxically, decentralization
underperforms because of weak central
institutions, either due to political instability or a
lack of control of basic functions of government,
such as unified tax administration or treasury
and budget implementation controls. If decen
tralization is to meet its promise, capacity
constraints and their consequences must be
recognized and efforts to develop appropriate
capacities need to be adopted.
Adapting to Change

Conditions and motivations for decentralization
change, sometimes rapidly and dramatically.
These changes can be relatively routine, such
as the adoption of new legislation or the
turnover of a government power after an
election. They can also be momentous, such as
a major political shift or a sudden economic and
financial crisis. Local government policies and
systems need to respond effectively to these
changes, and adapt as necessary to shifting
circumstances. At the same time, the 2008
global financial crisis showed that adapting to
shifting circumstances can also damage local
governments. Local governments and their
advocates must be vigilant and be prepared to
defend their legitimate interests when they
come under threat.
Broad Policy Trends and Issues
Before reviewing major findings on local
government finance, it is important to
contextualize those findings by noting some
broader trends and common decentralization
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issues the report shows can affect local fiscal
performance. Some of these are experienced
globally, while others are particularly relevant
in certain regions or some subset of countries
across regions.

for the associated risk management would
considerably increase the resource needs of local
governments
worldwide.
The
financial
implications for local governments of the
response to environmental challenges are only
beginning to be understood.

Global Crisis
Partial or Interrupted Decentralization

The financial and economic crisis noted above is
affecting local governments globally. Emerging
countries of Asia and some in Latin America have
been less impacted, but others have suffered
drastic effects. In March 2010, for example, the
Greek government reduced by decree the
number of local governments from 1,034 to 355
in order to save an estimated 1.2 billion euros
annually.
The pains of fiscal adjustment due to the crisis
are being strongly felt by local governments in all
the continents. In a number of countries in
Africa, Eurasia, and Latin America, central
governments have cut transfers or introduced
recentralization measures. In some regions, the
effects of the crisis simply compound the effects
of existing challenges. In Africa, for example,
trade liberalization and fiscal transition, and in
less developed countries more generally, poverty
and informality have long presented challenges
for public finance in general and local
governments in particular.
Even in the most advanced countries,
stabilization
policies
to
reduce
public
indebtedness, such as those being adopted in
Europe and North America, are deeply impacting
local finances. Local governments in many of
those countries fear that a disproportionate
share of the costs of further fiscal consolidation
will fall on them in the form of cuts in
intergovernmental transfers, restrictions on local
credit, and other austerity measures.
The financial and economic crisis is not the only
global crisis with relevance for local
governments.
Financing
climate
change
mitigation policies and the investments required

Reform

The global crisis provides one example of how
decentralization can be stalled or reversed, but
this is a more general problem taking different
forms as evidenced in the regional chapters.
Fiscal decentralization frameworks involve
complex systems with many interrelated
components, and some are easier to implement
or politically more feasible than others. Thus,
some local finance systems are only partially
designed (relative to best practice principles)
and some are only partially implemented even if
they are mandated in the legal framework
design.
If only certain elements of the system are
implemented
or
partially
implemented,
problems
can arise
because of
the
interdependencies involved. Deficiencies with
one component often undermine the ability of
the overall system to function effectively. For
example, lack of clarity with functional
assignment can lead to uncertainty regarding
the financial needs of local governments.
Similarly, problems with the design and
implementation of intergovernmental transfer
systems can compromise incentives and
capacities for local service delivery, local
revenue generation, and local borrowing.
Among the most pervasive and damaging
instances of incomplete decentralization is the
assignment of too few revenues to finance
assigned functions. At a global scale, very few
countries escape dealing with major gaps
between local expenditure and local revenues.
This can result from a flaw in system design,
but revenue inadequacy tends to occur for
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political or capacity reasons even in countries
where constitutional or legal provisions prohibit
unfunded local government mandates. The
problem tends to be more significant in some
regions. African countries, for example, generally
have much less decentralization of revenues
than of expenditures, leading to particularly
severe revenue-expenditure gaps.
Demographic Shifts

UCLG. 2007. UCLG
Policy Paper on Local
Finance. UCLG.
World Bank (2005)
estimated the
investment needs in
public infrastructure
in developing
countries, amounting
to 600 billion USD
per year over the
next 25 years.
However, these
figures include all
public
infrastructures,
whether national
(energy,
communications and
information
technology,
transport, water and
sanitation, etc.) or
urban (local roads,
local water supply,
and sanitation, waste
disposals, schools,
street lighting...).
(World Bank. 2005.
Infrastructure and
the World Bank: A
progress report. The
World Bank). The
UCLG Committee on
Local Finance
estimated one third
of this amount, i.e.
0.4 percent of World
GDP, needs to be
channeled to urban
infrastructure
(UCLG. 2007. UCLG
Policy Paper on Local
Finance. UCLG).

Many European countries are confronted with
the challenge of coping with the effects on
public finances of a rapidly ageing population
and the need to integrate immigrants into the
labor market and society at large. The ageing
population challenge is also relevant in several
countries in Asia, such as China and Japan, and
in Eurasia, such as Russia and Ukraine. In some
developing countries, the growth of youth as a
share of population poses different types of
service challenges that also have serious
financial implications.
Rapidly increasing urbanization, particularly
in many of the developing countries of
Africa, Asia, and Latin America, continues to
create demand for public services and
infrastructure that requires a huge volume
of resources. The needs are even larger if
investments for climate change adaptation
are included. Given available information on
maintenance and development costs of urban
investments, it would seem reasonable to
expect a need for about 200 billion USD per
year over the next 25 years for the
developing countries alone1 ; this represents
only one-third of the total spending need for
total public infrastructure spending estimated
by the World Bank.2
Jurisdictional Fragmentation

Fragmentation is a major issue for many
countries in most regions of the world. In many
countries the appropriate structure and size of
local governments is an ongoing debate. Small

local governments cannot independently take
advantage of economies of scale in the delivery
of some services, resulting in higher costs.
Smaller local governments, however, generally
provide a stronger political connection to
citizens and may be better able to respond to
local demands. Getting the right balance, e.g.
by maintaining smaller local governments
but providing mechanisms for cooperative
arrangements among them and links to higher
levels for large scale services, is a critical
challenge in many counties.
Thailand has more than 7,500 bottom tier local
governments with an average population of
less than 10 000, and there are concerns that
these are too small for service delivery. In
some cases, such as Uganda or Dominican
Republic, new local governments are being
constantly created, diluting the capacity of
local governments that were only recently
empowered. In a number of countries perverse
incentives, such as offering equal lump sum
transfers to all local governments regardless of
size, create incentives for further jurisdictional
fragmentation.
On the other hand, in countries such as France
(with 36,600 local governments), citizens
strongly identify with smaller local governments
(communes). These are said to bring
greater representation and accountability, thus
potentially balancing the additional costs
represented by the inability to realize economies
of scale, particularly if the latter can be realized
by creating cooperative arrangements among
the smaller units. When local governments in
South Africa were substantially consolidated in
2002, some analysts expressed concern
that the new larger, more fiscally viable local
governments had damaged political connectivity
to citizens in some areas.
Deconcentration and Devolution

Devolution of spending and taxing powers to
autonomous local governments is generally
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held up as the standard for decentralization,
but even some countries with elected local
councils maintain deconcentrated administration.
In Kenya, for example, district administrations
exist in the same territory as elected county
councils. There is little clarity with respect to
their distinct functions, sometimes resulting in
service redundancy or gaps (although this
situation should be corrected by forthcoming
reforms based on the 2010 constitution).

the latter local authorities were suspended
in 2009 by agreement between federal and
provincial authorities) of accountable local
governments diminishes their chances for
attaining
the
potential
benefits
of
decentralization. Limited authority for local
governments is also present in unitary
systems with strong hierarchical links
between intermediate and local tiers of
governments, such as China or Vietnam.

In other cases, empowered local governments
have not been created. In the MEWA region, for
example, deconcentrated local administration
prevails except in Turkey and Palestine. Similar
situations can be found in countries in other
regions, such as Egypt, Pakistan, Bangladesh,
Thailand, and Kazakhstan. The use of local
governments as deconcentrated units of the
central administration leaves unexploited
efficiency gains in the delivery of public services
that are achievable with devolved systems by
better matching the needs and preferences of
local residents and making local officials more
accountable to citizens.

The Role of International Development

Intermediate Governments in Federal
and Hierarchical Systems

While a federal country is often associated with
high fiscal decentralization, many federal
constitutions do not recognize directly the right
of local entities to self government. Instead,
they empower states or other intermediate
governments to establish fiscal relationships
with local governments. This approach has led
to considerable fiscal powers for local govern
ments in Brazil, Canada, South Africa, and the
United States.
In other cases, such as Argentina, Australia,
India, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, and
Russia, local governments enjoy (often
considerably) less fiscal autonomy even
than those in some unitary countries with
more centralized traditions. Depriving large
populous countries like India or Pakistan (in

Agencies

International development agencies often
create challenges for the very developing
countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America
that they are supposed to be assisting
through support for decentralization and local
government reforms. There are various issues
in this regard, but two are particularly
important. First, these agencies have often
pushed particular types of reforms, sometimes
based on particular objectives of the agencies
or simply what has worked in other countries.
As a result, in some cases, the reforms being
promoted have been inappropriate for recipient
countries or have proven unsustainable
because there is no strong national ownership.
Second, the donors have commonly created
parallel
mechanisms
to
implement
programs that support the financing and
delivery of local services because of con
cerns about low local administrative capa
city, corruption, and other institutional
weaknesses in the host country. These
mechanisms can be based at higher levels
or at local levels, but in either case they
bypass the regular decision-making and
resource management procedures of local
governments. They can improve service
delivery and may be appropriate in some
form at early stages of decentralization
when local governments are weak, but they
ultimately undermine the legitimacy and
effectiveness of local governments unless
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the systems and procedures they use are
adapted and institutionalized into regular
government operations.
Local Government Finance:
Main Issues and Challenges
As outlined in the introduction of the report,
several key aspects of fiscal systems need
to be in place and meet certain basic
principles for local governments to perform
effectively. These include expenditure
assignments and management; local own
source (autonomous) revenues; properly
structured intergovernmental transfers; and,
where appropriate, access to borrowing and
other alternatives to mobilize resources for
development expenditures. This
section
outlines key issues and challenges identified in
the regional chapters with respect to each of
these issues.
The emphasis in this section is on identifying
problems and challenges that require attention,
but it is important to acknowledge, as noted in
the Introduction and some regional chapters,
that there have been very significant
improvements in local finance over the
past decades in many developed and also
developing countries. These improvements
range from increased efficiency in public
expenditures to greater revenue mobilization,
and to innovations in public management, such
as the more general adoption of the type of
participatory budgeting that began in Latin
America.
Expenditure Assignment and Management

A clear assignment of responsibilities and
explicit methodologies to translate expenditure
responsibilities into financial needs are
fundamental for local finance. Deficiencies on
this front weaken local governments and
undermine the rest of the local fiscal
framework. The challenges commonly fall under
a number of categories outlined below.

Clarity in expenditure assignment: Insufficient
clarity occurs in many regions, particularly in
developing countries in Africa, Asia, Eurasia,
and Latin America. This results from poorly
drafted
laws
and
conflicts
between
decentralization laws and sectoral laws
regarding
specific
services.
Sectoral
responsibilities
may
continue
to
be
implemented by line ministries without
coordination or in competition with local
governments, duplicating efforts by keeping
deconcentrated offices and staff at predecentralization levels; this is a common
occurrence, for example, in African and Latin
American countries. The ambiguity of
expenditure assignments can be more severe
where there are more levels of government, as
in China, and in federations where intermediate
levels have significant but inadequately defined
control over local governments under their
jurisdiction, such as in the case of India. A
related institutional issue in some countries, such
as Australia and Argentina, is whether local
governments should obtain separate legal
status from their intermediate level governments,
provinces, or states.
Suitability of and compliance with expendi
ture assignment: In some cases central
authorities still play an unwarranted role in
the delivery of basic local services,
sometimes contrary to decentralization law.
This can result in levels and types of services
that differ from those desired by local people.
In other cases, services with benefit spillovers
(affecting people of jurisdictions beyond
direct beneficiaries) or a heavy focus on
redistribution lack coordination of tasks with
higher levels of government; this can result in
insufficient or uneven provision of services.
This happens, for example, in China, which
assigns responsibility for social security and
public pensions to local governments.
Funding expenditure mandates: Lack of clarity
in functional assignment creates room for cost
shifting among levels of government, often
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through
unfunded
local
expenditure
mandates that can be can be extremely
burdensome. These can involve requiring
local governments to deliver specific services,
use particular delivery approaches, or meet
certain input or output standards in service
delivery. This is a common occurrence
among developing and developed countries.
Sometimes such mandates may involve
services that local governments are not
required to provide under local government
legislation.
Budget approval and control by higher level
authorities: The central or regional autho
rities assist with and closely oversee —and
ultimately may even approve— the budgets
voted on by local elected councils in many
countries, particularly in Africa, Asia, Eurasia,
Latin America, and MEWA regions. This
practice of ex-ante control weakens the
budgetary autonomy of local authorities.
Incentives for local expenditure efficiency:
Particularly in developing countries, local
government spending quality is often low in
terms of the outcomes produced relative to
the costs incurred. This is partly attributable
to resource constraints and the oftenexcessive administrative shares of the local
government budget. But other factors noted
above (lack of clarity in functional
assignments, unfunded mandates, etc.)
and below (conditional transfers and low
revenue autonomy) also undermine local
accountability and incentives to use resources
efficiently.
Local Revenue Generation/Autonomy

Local revenue generation and autonomy are
critical for local governments to be able to
meet their expenditure responsibilities in an
accountable and efficient way. Yet there are
very few countries in the world that so far have
provided local governments with the means
and autonomy needed to raise adequate

revenues. This problem is manifested in various
ways related to the design and use of local
revenue systems.
Vertical fiscal imbalances: The transfer of ex
penditure responsibilities to local govern
ments has often not been accompanied by
devolution of corresponding revenue sources
(including intergovernmental transfers, which
are discussed below). As noted above, local
government revenues in many regions play a
minor role in national public budgets. This has
resulted in increasing financial pressures on
the local government expenditure, and even
where resources are more adequate, greater
local government dependence on central
transfers.
Revenue autonomy: Autonomy is highly
constrained in most of Africa, Asia, and the
Middle East and West Asia. The situation is
better in Eurasia and Latin America, but not
uniformly. Local governments have limited or
no authority to introduce new taxes, and to
decide on some or all tax rates, fees, and
user charges. Even some decentralized
countries, such as Australia, limit local revenue
autonomy. A number of prominent attempts to
enhance tax autonomy and reduce transfer
dependence, such as recent "Trinity Reforms"
in Japan, have only partially succeeded.
Revenue autonomy is stronger, but not without
challenges, in advanced economies of Western
Europe and North America.
Property taxation challenges: The property tax
is the most commonly recommended and
globally used local government tax, but its
significant revenue potential often remains
unrealized. On average developing countries
raise 0.5 percent of GDP from property tax
compared to two percent in developed
countries. This is partly because the tax is
unpopular— even in some developed countries
where it plays a significant role (U.S., Canada,
U.K.), citizen opposition has been strong.
In addition, it is difficult and expensive to
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administer, all the more so in many developing
countries without well defined property
registers, with sizable informal areas, and with
weaker local capacity for value assessments,
enforcement, and collection.
Diversification of the local tax base: Local tax
bases are often narrow, especially given the
problems with heavy reliance on the property
tax. A number of countries in Europe and
North America use local personal income
taxes. A local piggyback, flat-rate personal
income tax is collected with the national
income tax in Nordic countries and some
transition economies of Central and Eastern
Europe. In Latin America, several countries,
such as Brazil, Chile, and Colombia use
various types of local business taxation. Local
sales taxes are used in a few countries,
notably in Canada, with the presence of a
national VAT, and in the United States, where
there is no VAT. Poor diversification of the
local tax base is often aggravated by the lack
of flexibility to adapt to evolving circumstan
ces (for example, growth in the service
sector). Inelasticity (lack of revenue response
to changes in the economic base) of many
local taxes over time is problematic as
progressively increasing demand for services
and costs outstrip revenue growth. In a
number of African countries (Tanzania,
Uganda, and Zambia) some viable local taxes
have been recently eliminated and partially
replaced with transfers, and many countries,
prominently Korea, suffer from a proliferation
of "nuisance taxes" that yield low revenues
relative to collection costs.
Fees and user charges: Local governments
need to establish fees for services, ideally on a
cost-recovery basis where this is feasible. In
Canada and the U.S.,
local governments
generate one-quarter of their own revenues
with fees and charges, which is all the more
significant given their broad high levels of local
own tax revenue. The situation is very different
in many developing countries. In some African

countries, such as Algeria, Benin, Egypt and
Tunisia, local governments have no authority to
set local fees and charges.
Politics of local revenues: Political barriers to
local revenue generation can be seen in both
the reluctance of local government to raise
taxes (for instance, in some EU countries) as
well as in the limitations imposed on local
revenue generation legislated by higher levels
of government or citizen referendums (in many
states in the U.S.). To some extent these phe
nomena result from poor taxpayer education
and general expectations by citizens for more
and better quality services with the same or
lower taxes.
Local and central roles in revenue collection:
International practice varies as countries
seek to maximize revenues while minimizing
administration and compliance costs
(which favor a role for higher levels in
administration
and
enforcement)
and
maximizing local accountability and local
information advantages (which favor local
governments'
direct
involvement
in
administration and enforcement). Although
centralized mechanisms are in principle
desirable for certain taxes, central agencies
do not in some regions, including MEWA and
West Africa, transfer the resources they
collect to local governments in a timely
manner. The lack of incentives for central tax
authorities to collect local revenues can also
be a problem. The experience of a variety of
countries (Costa Rica, Jordan, and some
countries in Eurasia) shows significant increases
in revenue collections when tax administration
responsibilities are transferred from central to
local authorities.
Intergovernmental Transfers

A properly structured system of intergovern
mental transfers is a critical component of a
local finance system. The use of transfers,
however, faces a number of challenges that are
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dealt with in different ways and to varying
degrees across regions and countries.

equalization transfers, although the situation is
improving.

Appropriate and stable revenue sharing: Most
countries share some central taxes with local
governments, an arrangement that is simple
and has high revenue potential. This can be a
partial solution to vertical imbalances, but
shared
revenues
suffer
from
various
constraints. Revenue sharing on a derivation
basis can be seen as a stimulus for local
economic activity, but it can also reinforce
horizontal disparities and leads to higher
volatility of local revenues. Particularly in
developing countries, the amounts shared may
be uncertain or lack transparency, making long
term planning difficult for local governments.
This is the case in a number of West African
countries, where central governments withhold
for their own purposes or delay resources to
which local governments are entitled. Perhaps
most importantly, substantial revenue sharing
can create perverse incentives for local revenue
generation, undermining both local autonomy
and the accountability of local governments to
their constituents.

Equalization transfer design: Where equalization
schemes exist, they often present problems; for
example, (1) only differences in fiscal capacity or
expenditure needs, instead of both, are
considered; (2) actual revenues, instead of fiscal
capacity, are measured, creating disincentives
for local revenue mobilization; (3) the pool of
funds are not stable or well defined, or (4) the
use of funds is subject to rigid conditions that in
effect make the equalization grants, which are
normally general purpose grants without use
restrictions, into conditional transfers. In
federal countries, such as Australia, there are
issues regarding how second tier governments
(the states) interpret federal policies regarding
equalization.

Horizontal fiscal imbalances: Despite the often
significant differences across local governments
in expenditure needs and the ability to finance
them, many countries lack effective equalization
grants. In Africa, just a few countries (Morocco
and South Africa) have introduced them, and in
MEWA there are none. The situation is a little
better in Latin America, where a few countries
(e.g. Brazil and Chile) use explicit equalization
schemes, although more countries in the region
employ only limited redistribution elements in
revenue sharing schemes. Some Asian countries
use equalization transfers (e.g. Australia,
Indonesia, Japan), while others virtually ignore
fiscal disparities (e.g. China, India, Philippines,
New Zealand). Equalization grants are common
in Eurasia, Europe, and North America (except at
the federal level in the United States), but with
varying effectiveness. Some Eurasian countries
have not used transparent methodologies for

Conditional transfer design: Conditional grants
from upper level governments are a key
element of local fiscal frameworks. Such
grants can (1) promote national standards
and goals in the provision of important
services that have been decentralized, for
example, some aspects of education and
health; (2) address inter-jurisdictional ex
ternalities with respect to, for example,
environmental concerns; or (3) support local
government
infrastructure
investments.
Conditional or earmarked grants exist in many
countries, especially for capital infrastructure
purposes. However, in certain regions, such as
Eurasia, conditional grants are not well
developed. In other countries, such as Egypt,
Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda, conditional
transfers excessively dominate total transfers.
Several problems are often associated with this
type of grant, including their number and com
plexity, which impose high compliance costs on
local governments; lack of transparency,
stability or timeliness; and sometimes political
manipulation. In addition, excessive reliance on
conditional grants can overly constrain local
government autonomy and move their focus
from local to national priorities, potentially
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reducing their own comparative advantage in
focusing on local needs.
Performance based grants. A relatively recent
innovation in the field of transfers has been the
introduction of performance based transfers in
some African and Asian countries with support
from international organizations. Performance
based grants condition the transfer of funds to
meeting certain standards and objectives,
generally leaving local governments to decide
how best to use the funds. This type of transfer
combines the flexibility of unconditional grants
with an unconventional form of conditionality.
On the downside, these transfers may privilege
jurisdictions
with greater administrative
capacity, and they may suffer from the
problems associated with voucher programs.
Thus far they have been used more to promote
compliance with financial and administrative
management procedures than to improve
service delivery outcomes. It is too early to
definitively judge the effectiveness of
performance based transfers but they are a
promising mechanism and further trials are
certainly desirable.
Local Government Borrowing and Access
to Financial Markets

Perhaps the most neglected aspect of local
government finance in many regions of the world
is borrowing. In the context of the rapid
urbanization
discussed
earlier,
especially
developing countries in Africa and Asia, the need
for infrastructure investment is paramount. In
this
context,
borrowing,
with
the
intergenerational equity that it entails, is
potentially an important means to finance longer
term investments. At the same time, there are
multiple factors that need to be considered.
Local government borrowing and fiscal respon
sibility frameworks. These frameworks are
often
weakly
developed
and
poorly
implemented. Some frameworks are highly
restrictive,
effectively
precluding
local

government borrowing (e.g. Denmark,
Chile,
Kenya
and
Tunisia).
Other
frameworks are too lax, potentially allowing
for the type of risky behavior that occurred
in the 1990s in Brazil and Argentina. In a
few case such as South Africa, robust
frameworks that promote responsible
borrowing have been developed.
Access to credit. In many cases, especially in
poor developing countries, local governments
often have poor and unreliable access to credit.
Financial markets are not well developed, and
many local governments do not have credit
histories or do not meet technical standards
required by lenders. The situation is brighter in
the short and medium term in emerging
economies where financial markets tend to be
more developed with the introduction of
systems for disclosure, credit ratings, pricing
benchmarks, and so forth.
Special institutions. Special credit institutions
that have been set up to lend to local
governments (as is the case in more than 60
countries, often with support from international
organizations in developing countries) have
rarely performed well. Their often disappointing
results have been associated with the
politicization of
lending decisions and
problematic design issues. Many of the
intermediary institutions are not sufficiently
independent from the government, and they
are not allowed or have not attempted to link
with domestic credit markets. In this regard,
local governments are not supported in
learning how to become familiar with and
develop capacity to comply with market
expectations regarding financial capacities,
disclosures, provisioning, and so on.
Central government practices. A number of
central government practices, such as weak
appraisal mechanisms for loans from
government affiliated credit institutions, local
government bailouts and automatic intercepts,
have disrupted the normal development of local
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credit markets. There has been a pervasive
problem with approval by government
associated lending mechanisms of inadequately
vetted loans for non-viable projects. The
practice of bailouts when local governments
cannot or will not repay their loans undermines
their fiscal discipline and distorts the credit
market. Although reliance on automatic
intercepts from transfers are generally
associated with better repayment to special
credit institutions and can help to develop
access to credit, maintaining them for long
periods without encouraging local government
graduation to more market oriented sources
can create poor incentives for local govern
ments to properly consider and lenders to
properly appraise local government projects.
Links to the broader intergovernmental fiscal
system. Other aspects of local government
finance covered above are sometimes not
conducive to borrowing. Borrowing can be
curtailed if local governments have insufficient
access to discretionary sources of revenue to
make loan payments or if intergovernmental
transfers undermine incentives for even
relatively wealthy local governments to borrow,
for self-financing development projects.
Lack of appropriate financial management
practices also undermines the ability of local
governments to properly prepare development
projects, qualify for credit, and manage their
debt portfolios.

autonomy. In many countries in Latin America,
Asia, Eurasia, and even in Europe, local govern
ments lack legitimacy because they cannot
meet important responsibilities with available
resources. Although some needed actions will
be difficult to quickly implement, there is much
that can be done.
Expenditure Assignment and Management

A clear assignment of expenditure respon
sibilities should be at the top of national
reform agendas for local government
finance. There are some important political
economy issues noted throughout the
report that often make this step difficult.
Several basic measures need to be followed
for this foundational reform that will in
some cases require a revision of the
legal framework and harmonization of
decentralization and sector laws.
Identify the exclusive responsibilities of
local governments is needed to increase the
clarity required for accountability. In cases
where there is legal clarity and the
assignments have not been implemented,
action is needed to enforce the provisions of
the legal framework. In cases where it is
deemed necessary to have concurrent
responsibilities for particular services, it is
important to identify which level has specific
responsibilities for various aspects — i. e.
regulation, financing, and implementation.

Recommendations
The findings of GOLD II clearly indicate that
local governments around the world
-from the most industrialized to the least
developed countries- suffer from problems
and challenges in their local government
finance systems, and in some respects the
situation has stagnated or worsened in recent
years. In Africa local governments represent
well under 10 percent of public expenditures
and less of pubic revenue. MEWA countries also
have limited resources and even more limited

Limit higher controls on local expenditures. In
the EU, for example, the Commission should
not excessively control or interfere with local
service delivery. In multi-tier systems the role
played by intermediate tiers (states and
provinces) in controlling local expenditures
should be appropriate and restrained. There
should be limited infringement on local
autonomy, and with specifically local services,
intermediate levels should not be interfering. In
developing environments where there are
significant differences in administrative
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capacity across local governments, asymmetric
assignment of responsibilities may be
justified, at least temporarily. Over time local
governments can graduate —with appropriate
incentives and support— to more complete levels
of responsibility as their capacity is developed.
Determine financial requirements. For a clear
assignment of expenditure responsibilities
to become useful for other aspects of the
local fiscal framework, they must be
translated into expenditure needs/financing
requirements through application of an
appropriate standardized methodology. A
systematic evaluation of the cost of transferred
responsibilities should precede the transfers of
task and resources.
Fund all mandates. It is important to be explicit
that the level of government with the power to
regulate a function also has the obligation to pay
for it. Increasing coordination and dialogue
among levels of government regarding functional
assignment is also needed, and there should be
ex-ante review of all government legislation
regarding local governments to detect any
unfunded mandates.
Ensure that human resources follow functions.
Funding/staffing of deconcentrated offices of
line ministries should be downscaled or
eliminated. This will reflect the functions
transferred to local governments and ensure
that they have the staff to execute them, while
at the same time reducing the existence of staff
at other levels who might interfere with local
government functions.
Reduce and progressively eliminate ex ante
control of local government budgets. In some
developing environments this may not be
possible to do quickly, but as the local finance
system matures it is important to shift from
an emphasis on ex ante control to an emphasis
on ex post control, such as audits, and to a
greater focus on developing accountability to
the citizens.

Implement expenditure decentralization stra
tegically. It may be appropriate to use the type
of asymmetry noted above, and both
performance incentives and capacity building
may be needed. Capacity building and technical
assistance should support local governments to
establish a foundation in the first stages of
decentralization and then help them adapt to
performance incentives in later stages.
Local Revenue Generation and Autonomy

Autonomous local revenue generation is the
most serious fiscal challenge faced in a majority
of countries globally. Althought the exact set of
revenue reforms will vary across countries, this
type of reform is to some extent needed in
most countries.
Increase reliance on own revenues with
meaningful discretion. This strengthens the
link between benefits and costs of local
services, making
local officials more
accountable to taxpayers and more fiscally
responsible. This can be done through
reforms to existing sources of revenue and/or
the addition of new sources, and appropiate
systems and capacity must be developed in
conjunction with expanded revenue authority.
Reform and modernize property tax
administration. Clearly the poor revenue
performance of the property tax has a heavy
administrative component. But there are
political limits to using this source, so the
nature and extent of reforms must be decided
on a case-by-case basis.
Diversify the local tax base. This is needed in
many countries but reforms should target
viable and productive local revenues (i.e. not
nuisance taxes) as well as ensure that local
economic activity will not be impeded.
Only a limited number of local taxes meet these
criteria, including vehicle taxes, business
license taxes, piggyback income taxes and
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betterment levies on real estate. Vehicle taxes
can be based on registration, licensing, parking
and similar bases. Business taxes can take
different forms, but typically use sales turnover
as a proxy for the tax base; care must be taken
not to convert them into sales taxes that
conflict with other consumption taxes,
particularly national VAT. Going further in the
direction of increasing local tax autonomy
would be the introduction of a local piggy-back
personal income tax with a flat rate collected at
the same time as the national income tax is
collected. Betterment levies are an important
means for financing infrastructure investments
in countries where they are used. All of these
sources can be extremely productive, but they
are most relevant for urban and intermediatelevel (states, provinces) governments.
In addition to these more traditional resources,
a potentially valuable but relatively unexploited
source in most regions is environmental or
"green" taxation related to waste management,
water and air polluting activities, and the
production of energy. Green taxes would
provide a so-called "double dividend" since they
promote both revenue generation and a cleaner
environment. There are also opportunities to
develop sources of revenue based on the
increasingly important knowledge economy.
There is often an opportunity to adapt the fiscal
system to include some taxation on activities
from the informal sector, particularly in de
veloping countries.

Carefully
organize local tax
collection
responsibilities. The challenges of getting
the right arrangements between central and
local governments, as noted above, are
considerable. With local collection, robust
systems and incentives are needed for the
potential benefits to be realized. When
centralized administration of local taxes is
appropriate, it is important to establish
the right incentives for central tax
administrations. Extensive dialogue and
cooperation between different levels of tax
administration is always desirable and should
be institutionalized. This includes information
sharing on collections with local governments
and allowing their participation in some
aspects of management.
Engage local government officials more fully
in mobilizing local resources, linking them to
service delivery, and using them more
transparently. Local officials must assume
their responsibility to mobilize the local
resources required to improve local service
provision. The tax morale of local residents
and their willingness to contribute to the local
funds can be improved through campaigns of
fiscal awareness that inform citizens about
how resources are used and how decisions
are made. Local officials should also ensure
the transparent management of funds and
encourage citizen participation in order to
increase their confidence on the budget
process.
Intergovernmental Transfers

Increase freedom to raise fees and user charges.
There are economic, technical, and political
challenges and limitations associated with such
revenues, but they could be more extensively
used in most countries. Better and more explicit
pricing for public services may help to improve
efficiency if political obstacles to charges can be
overcome. The principle of cost recovery on
public services should be promoted where
feasible, but in a way that does not undermine
access to basic services by the poor.

Considerable challenges and weaknesses in
intergovernmental transfer systems were
outlined above. Multiple steps could commonly
be taken to improve the structure and operation
of intergovernmental transfer systems.
Assure predicate, regular, and transparent
transfer mechanisms. A legal framework should
establish a minimum level of public resources
that the central government must transfer every

United Cities and Local Governments

year to local authorities and offer sufficient
assurance that they will be allocated in a clear
and fair manner.
Secure an appropriate balance among the
various types of transfers. There is no hard and
fast rule about derivation based versus formula
allocated tax sharing, although the former may
worsen fiscal disparities, reinforcing the need
for equalization (see below). Similarly, there
is no normatively ideal balance between
unconditional and conditional transfers. A
significant share of unconditional funds hovever
reinforces local government autonomy and
accountability and it is the better option to
support local autonomy and locally driven
development when local governments have
acquired minimum capacities.
Expand and improve the use of equalization
transfers. Countries that do not use them should
consider doing so to offset the differential
abilities of local governments to meet basic
service needs. Countries that do use them
should take stock of their approach and move
towards a system that uses an explicit and stable
rule to determine the pool of funds; takes
expenditure needs and revenue capacity (as
opposed to actual expenditures or revenues)
into account when allocating funds; and allows
unconditional use of transferred funds. In
countries where elements of equalization are
imbedded in revenue sharing, as is common in
Latin America, it would be desirable, following
the rule of using a single instrument for each
objective, to unbundle those schemes and
separately introduce an explicit equalization
transfer with the properties listed above.
Review and improve mechanisms used for
allocating resources under conditional grants.
Beyond the basic guidelines on equalization
grants noted above, best practice for
conditional
grant
systems
calls
for
simplification, moving toward using fewer
separate block grants with clear sectoral
objectives and providing governments with

sufficient flexibility for deciding on the best
use of the funds while meeting the broader
sectoral objectives defined by the upper level
authorities.
Consolidating grants where large numbers of
poorly coordinated programs exist. In some
countries in Europe and Asia, for example,
there are too many grants that are not clearly
distinguished and the resources could be
more productively used in a more consolidated
system.
Local Government Borrowing and
Investment Finance

In many countries, there are considerable
opportunities for increasing the use of borrowing
and other investment finance mechanisms as
well as expanding and improving sources of
funding for this purpose. A number of specific
policies and reforms can often support this goal.
Promote
local
government
borrowing.
Borrowing is one of the necessary pillars of local
finance. Responsible local borrowing, guided by
prudent rules and regulations (a fiscal
responsibility framework) should be allowed
where feasible, in parallel to the strengthening
of local capacities.
Develop and strengthen legal and regulatory
frameworks for local government borrowing.
Rules regarding debt level and debt service
ratios need not be overly restrictive, but
central authorities need to enforce hard
budget constraints and avoid bailouts. Central
monitoring of local borrowing is critical,
especially where private market discipline
is not operational. Such monitoring should
cover not only regular debt but also "floating
debt" or budgetary arrears with official
institutions and private suppliers, and local
government
guarantees
for
municipal
enterprises. Monitoring should be complemented
with a credible system of penalties for lack of
compliance.
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Expand and improve options and support me
chanisms for local government
borrowing,
including support where appropriate to
intermediate financial institutions or municipal
development funds. Beyond the regulation and
monitoring, an even more important challenge
for most developing countries is to facilitate a
significant increase in credit availability to local
governments for responsible borrowing, es
pecially for smaller municipalities. The solution
may be the creation of official financial
intermediaries or municipal lending institutions,
such as Municipal Development Banks or
Funds. International experience, however,
suggests that they must focus on lending
operations rather than get involved in other
matters (such as technical assistance to local
governments), should be operated following
strict banking criteria (including project
appraisal), and should increase the share of
private capital in their pool of resources over
time. Policies to encourage the development of
private markets for local credit are equally
important. The exact mix of these activities will
depend on the context of a particular country
following the general rule to use the market to
the extent feasible and to use public or mixed
lending mechanisms in a way that prepares
local governments for eventual commercial
borrowing.

capacities and conditions and should not be seen
as an easy alternative to borrowing.
Determine an appropriate role in infrastructure
finance for International Financial Institutions
and other development agencies. These
institutions have long played an important role
in developing and some transition countries,
and in many cases they will continue to do so
for the foreseeable future. Such resources have
traditionally flowed to central governments with
onlending to local governments. Such
onlending should comply with the basic
principles outlined above, and there should be
an increasing role for direct sub-sovereign
lending, especially to larger cities in countries
where this is feasible.
Framing Institutional Reform

The finance system reforms outlined above will
need to be reinforced by other measures of a
more institutional nature, most of which were
discussed earlier in this chapter to set the stage
for the discussion of fiscal decentralization. A
number of key institutional issues often impact
local finances and merit consideration.
Assess and respond as necessary to local
government jurisdictional fragmentation.
Fragmentation is neither inherently desirable
nor undesirable, but as discussed above it can
create problems. There are two types of issues.

Reform other aspects of the local finance system
as necessary to enhance the prospects for local
government borrowing. Local governments
must have access to and effectively use existing
(and as needed additional) local taxes, user
charges, and central government grants
earmarked to local infrastructure. In addition, it
is necessary to have good financial management
practices in place.

The first is ensuring that any creation of new
jurisdictions is done according to clear criteria to
prevent the proliferation of non-viable entities.
In some cases there are perverse incentives
(e.g. in the transfer system) to create new
jurisdictions. These should be avoided.

Consider other investment financing mechanisms
where feasible. Tax increment financing,
betterment levies (valorization), and public
private partnerships can also provide necessary
investment finance for local governments. These
mechanisms, however, also require certain

The second is coping with existing frag
mentation that is deemed to be problematic.
Where politically feasible, consolidation of
small, non-viable units may be considered, but
this can undermine political connection and
local accountability. An alternative policy is to
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enable the creation of voluntary municipal
partnerships to deliver public services requiring
a minimum scale. Such associations and
agreements can also help to address benefit
spillovers across local government or the
exporting of the costs of local services to
neighboring jurisdictions by, for example,
through agreements that provide for sharing
service provision costs in accordance with
benefits. Other solutions include voluntary
jurisdictional consolidation, the creation of
special districts to take advantage of economies
of scale in selected services, or jointly
contracting with private firms.
Identify the right roles for and interactions
between deconcentrated and devolved
government entities. In cases where both
deconcentrated and devolved entities coexist
side by side, it should be made clear
what functions each is responsible for, and
they should respectively be provided with
appropriate staff, funding, and capacity to meet
their obligations. In countries where there has
been heavy reliance on deconcentration alone,
consideration could be given to introducing
democratically elected local governments
with devolved autonomy to prioritize their
budgets in accordance with the expressed
needs of local residents. It is important to
note that there can be room for both
deconcentrated and devolved levels in some
cases, but the system must be set up to tap
the advantages of each and prevent one type
—usually deconcentrated administration—
from undermining the other.
Assess the appropriate role for and operations of
external development assistance agencies and
financial institutions in developing countries. As
discussed earlier, there are two broad types of
problems —the heavy handedness of external
agents in promoting certain types of
decentralization reforms, and their tendency to
create parallel institutions and mechanisms for
implementing their programs that at least
partially bypass normal decision making and

resource allocation procedures of local govern
ments. The latter measure is generally intended
to compensate for real and perceived problems,
such as weak local government capacity,
corruption,
and ineffective and bureaucratic
central
government
agencies.
Parallel
mechanisms can help to deliver services and may
be appropriate in some form at early stages of
decentralization when local governments are
very weak, but ultimately they undermine the
legitimacy and effectiveness of local govern
ments. Neither of these donor approaches is
consistent with current thinking on aid
effectiveness, as reflected in the Paris Declaration
on Aid Effectiveness (2005), Accra Agenda
for Action (2008) and the upcoming Seoul
High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (2011).
The underlying philosophy highlights the
harmonization of development assistance with
national policy and stresses the importance of
using national systems to deliver services,
thereby
reinforcing
both
national and
subnational governments' capacity development
and their accountability to citizens.
Ensuring that external development partners
follow national policies is ideally the role of the
national government. In countries with weak
capacity and significant need for assistance,
however, this may be difficult. Under such
circumstances, the development partners
themselves need to take steps to ensure that
they align with national priorities.
Ideally parallel institutions should not be used.
If it is necessary to use them for reasons noted
above, they must be framed as temporary
arrangements with a clear plan for phasing
them out in favor of greater reliance on local
mechanisms as they become institutionalized.
When local mechanisms are sufficiently
credible, external agencies should foresee
budget support that empowers local decision
making.
International agencies need to ensure that
budget support programs contribute to the
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strengthening of local governments and the
development of their autonomy. Likewise,
sector-wide approaches are often a centralizing
force in practice, but they can be instrumental
in strengthening and implementing the specific
local powers and responsibilities as defined in
the legal frameworks for decentralization.
Create a regular and systematic dialogue
between local governments and the central
government on intergovernmental and local
financial policy. Although this has not been
previously discussed in an extensive way,
this report clearly leads to the conclusion
that local governments in many countries are
not sufficiently consulted on national
policies of great consequence for them.
Local governments could be consulted annually
during the national budget process on all
questions that directly or indirectly affect their
financing. This would require a mechanism
created to bring together the national actors
(legislature and executive) and local govern
ments. For such an approach to be effective, it
would be important to ensure access to
appropriate information on public finances,
both in general and specifically regarding local
government matters.
The Way Forward
Local governments have become more
important and more autonomous in many
countries around the world and higher
expectations have been placed on them.
Because this has happened in a challenging
global environment of substantial urbanization,
demographic shifts, climate change, and in
creasing risk, more attention needs to be given
to developing the basic fiscal architecture
that serves as a foundation for good
local government performance. As highlighted
throughout the report, there has been good
progress on many fronts in many countries, but
there are still major deficiencies and challenges
in most cases, both in terms of the elements of
the fiscal system that need to be in place and

the capacity of local governments to function
effectively. Unless these are confronted head
on, there are great dangers of social and
economic decline in the more advanced
economies and a failure to meet key in
creasingly urgent needs in developing coun
tries, including poverty reduction targets and
the Millennium Development Goals.
Although diversity is great across countries,
there are some shared challenges common to
many places. Clarity of functional assignment
in law and practice is a challenge in many
developing countries, and unfunded mandates
are a more general problem. In many countries
there is a pressing need to reassess the
structure of local taxes, and the degree of
autonomy that local governments have in
defining and using them. In many cases it will be
desirable to move beyond traditional local
revenue bases, and to search for a more
appropriate distribution of transferred and ownsource resources between national and local
governments, as well as among subnational
governments in the context of the emergence of
new tiers and new units at particular levels.
Growing investment requirements necessitate
an expansion of local government access to
capital, increasingly through market-oriented an
non-traditional mechanisms. There is also a
need for developing more innovative approaches
to raising resources and delivering services,
including through new and expanded forms of
partnership with different actors (private sector
and civil society).
As countries around the world strive to improve
their local government systems, they will have
to keep in mind some daunting short-term and
longer term challenges. The most immediate
challenge is the global financial and economic
crisis that started near the end of 2008, which
has resulted in revenue shortfalls for many
local governments and even attempts to
recentralize in some cases. Countries also face
longer term challenges that cut across all levels
of government, some of which can have
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particularly important implications for local
governments because of the increasing role this
government level plays in the provision of social
services, environmental control, and so on.
Some of these challenges are common (global
warming, energy crisis, etc.) but others differ by
region of the world. Rapidly increasing
urbanization, for example, particularly in many
of the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and
Latin America, is creating complex demands on
public services and infrastructure, yet local
governments in many countries in these regions
do not have the necessary authority and
autonomy to meet these demands. In addition
they too frequently cannot even cover the
operating costs of existing services much
less the costs of the substantial additional
investments needed.
Although many suggestions to improve local
government finance systems have been made
in the regional chapters and in this concluding
chapter, in closing this volume it is important to
reiterate again a few fundamental points
regarding the approach to reform.
First, each country is unique and the basic
principles for reform need to be tailored to the
economic, political, fiscal, and social realities of
individual countries. In Europe, for example,
substantial capacity exists, but there is a need
for system reforms and increased access to
investment finance. At the other end of the
spectrum, less developed countries in several
regions need to build basic institutions
gradually if reforms are to take root and be
sustained, although more capacity may exist in
larger cities for more immediate assumption of
functions and resources.
Second, consultation and collaboration among
levels of government and other actors will be
critical as efforts to strengthen local finance
systems advance —each actor has an
important role, but no actor alone can do what
needs to be done. In particular, central
governments need to treat local governments

as partners, with full consultation in all issues
of shared responsibilities. Local governments
also need to continue the efforts they are
already pursuing in many countries to reach
out to citizens, to develop partnerships with
non-governmental organizations and private
firms, and to seek innovative means to deal
with the challenges they face.
Third, while political factors are critical and there
is no point in pursuing reforms that are
politically infeasible, it is also important to
make decisions about reform based on
good information and evidence, the lack of
which created considerable challenges for the
preparation of this report. Better information
and analysis and broader and more transparent
dissemination of such inputs can create and
nurture a better environment for pursuing the
right reforms over time. In addition, the success
of initial modest reforms can create political mo
mentum for the adoption of more advanced
reforms with greater impact over time.
Finally, there is considerable value added from
regional and global cooperation, sharing
experiences, and learning by doing in pursuing
local finance reform. The role of UCLG, its
regional member organizations, and their
individual country members, provides a strong
foundation for collaborative learning at various
levels, and these actors need to continue to
strengthen those links going forward.
Global and regional events, online access to
information, country specific, regional and
global networking activities, diagnostics to help
countries and local governments to plan
concrete productive action, and forums and
mechanisms for sharing experiences and
expertise would all be productive ways to
support better local government finance.
Some opportunities in these areas already
exist, but much remains to be done to
consolidate and improve knowledge about
them, enhance access to them, and deepen
an understanding among all stakeholders of
how to effectively use them.

